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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE ST A 1~E OF UTAH 
8T.ATE OF UT .A.H, in the interest of: } 
C .. \l~L EVERETT LINDH, 
an alleged delinquent child, 
Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9318 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Juvenile Court for the Fifth District first o b-
tained jurisdiction of the appellant in December of 1958, 
and in the following 18 months he was brought before the 
court six times. Each time he appeared before the court 
he \\·as charged with being a delinquent child for reasons 
'vhich included being truant from school, unlawfully 
taking and using an automobile, incorrigible and insub-
ordinate to school faculty, running away from home, using 
tobacco, leaving the State \Yithout permission of the court, 
de~troying property, violation of a probation order, vio-
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lation of a curfew order, use of abusive language, pre-
venting an officer from properly discharging his duty, etc. 
At the fifth hearing on June 16, 1960, the court found 
appellant to be a delinquent child, ordered him com-
mitted to the State Industrial School but suspended the 
commitment upon condition that the boy live up to the 
terms of his probation. 
On June 22, 1960, Summons and Notice to Parents 
was served upon appellant's parents alleging that the 
appellant had violated his probation and naming specific 
violations. After a hearing was held the juvenile court 
revoked the suspension and committed the appellant to 
the Industrial School. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I 
THE JUVENILE COURT HAD CONTINUOUS 
JURISDICTION OVER THE APPELLANT BY 
STRICTLY CO~IPLYING WITH THE STATU-
TORY REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE AND 
HEARING, AND CONSEQUENTLY HAD 
POWER TO REVOICE THE SUSPENSION OF 
APPELLANT'S COM~IITI\IENT TO THE IN-
DUSTRIAL SCHOOL. THEREFORE, THE 
COMMITl\IENT IS VALID. 
PorNT II 
THE ORDER OF THE Jl"fl'"ENILE COURT IN 
TIIE DECREE D--.~TED ,JlTXE 28, 1960, IS 
DEFINITE AND CERTAIN _._~ND, THERE-
FORE, ENFORCEABLE. 
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PoiNT I 
THE JUVENILE COURT HAD CONTINUOUS 
JURISDICTION OVER THE APPELLANT BY 
STRICTLY COMPLYING WITH THE STATU-
TORY REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE AND 
I-IEARING, AND CONSEQUENTLY HAD 
POWER TO REVOKE THE SUSPENSION OF 
APPELLANT'S COMMITl\fENT TO THE IN-
DUSTRIAL SCHOOL. THEREFORE, THE 
COMMITMENT IS VALID. 
The lTtah Supreme Court in the early case of Mill v. 
Brown, 31 Utah 473, 88 Pac. 609 (1907), speaking of juve-
nile courts, stated that "'vhile, in the very nature of 
things, these courts cannot conform to the rigorous rules 
of criminal and law courts, their proceedings should still 
be conducted as a legal investigation.'' 
It is universally held that proceedings before a ju-
venile court are not criminal in nature and, therefore, the 
strict rules of criminal procedure are inapplicable to the 
proceedings, People v. Pica.nas, 260 N.Y. 72, 182 N.E. 675, 
85 A.L.R. 1097. Section 55-10-26 U.C.A. 1953, states 
that in all cases relating to the delinquency, neglect, de-
pendency or other cases of children and their disposition 
the court shall be regarded as exercising equity jurisdic-
tion. The court may conduct the hearing in an informal 
manner and may adopt any form of procedure in such 
cases which it deems best suited to ascertain the facts 
relating to such cases and to make a disposition in the 
best interests of such children and of the public. 
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It has been held in Utah as \Yell as in the majority of 
jurisdictions that Juvenile Court Acts are not violatiYe 
of constitutional rights, because strict "due process" is 
not complied with or because the act does not provide for 
trial by jury, arraignment and plea, \\Tarrant and notice, 
specific manner of trial and examination, or that a child 
is required to be a witness against himself. Jfill v. Broten 
(supra) ; Am. J ur. Juvenile Courts, Section 16, Vol. 31, 
p. 302. 
All of the cases cited by the appellant "Tith the 
exception of In re. Olsen are inapplicable because 
they are cases involving alleged criminals and pro-
cedure before criminal courts. The main purpose of 
juvenile proceedings is to determine ''That is b~st for the 
juvenile. It is well established today that when the ju-
venile court obtains jurisdiction of a child it becomes as 
a guardian to the child (parens patriae) to educate and 
to save it from a criminal career, not to inflict punish-
ment. Its actions are in no sense criminal. The juvenile 
court has greater latitude in the judgment it may render, 
and the child may be disposed of in any \vay, except to 
commit it to jail or prison ( \Yhich the Industrial School 
is not) that may, in the best interest of the child to the 
end that its wayward tendencies shall be corrected, and 
the child be saved to useful citizenship, Section 55-10-30 
U.C.A. 1953. 
Being a creature of statute the juy·enile court obtains 
and retains jurisdiction by compliance ''ith statute. See 
Re State in the Interest G raha·Jn, 110 l-;-tah 159, 170 P. 
~<l 172 (1946). 
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Section 55-10-13 requires that when information is 
received stating that a child is delinquent the probation 
officer must first make an inquiry to determine whether 
the public interests or the interest of the child requires 
that further action be taken. This inquiry takes into 
consideration the home and environmental situation of 
the child, his previous history, and the circumstances 
of the conditions alleged. This is reported to the court 
in \Yriting and if the court shall determine that formal 
jurisdiction should be required it shall authorize a peti-
tion to be filed. 
Section 55-10-14 U.C.A., 1953, requires that a peti-
tion first be filed alleging facts that bring the child within 
the jurisdiction of the court and also state the name of the 
guardians or responsible persons. 
Section 55-10-15 U.C.A., 1953, requires that after 
petition is filed, the court shall issue a summons reciting 
briefly the substance of the petition and requiring the 
appearance of the person \Yho have control and custody 
to appear before the court and bring the child. 
The juvenile court in this case religiously follo\Yed 
the above statutory procedure in bringing the appellant 
before it six times during a period of 18 months. At the 
fifth appearance the appellant \Yas committed to the State 
Industrial School but the Court suspended the execution 
of that placement contingent upon ''living up to the 
terms of his probation'' in hopes that appellant would 
desist from his delinquent habits. 
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Upon learning that the appellant had violated the 
terms of his probation the juvenile court again served 
summons and notice upon the appellant and his parents 
and after a hearing the suspension was refused the 
appellant, and he was committed to the State Industrial 
School. 
Appellant now complains that neither he nor his 
parents were aware that his probation would be sus-
pended. This complaint is made notwithstanding the fact 
that his freedom had been contingent upon not violating 
his probation. Eight days prior to the last summons re-
ceived by the appellant and his parents they had been ex-
plici ty told that if the appellant were to violate his pro-
bation he would be placed in the State Industrial School. 
Eight days later both appellant and his parents receiYed 
a summons that alleged that he had violated his proba-
tion and specifically named six offenses which he had 
committed which violated the terms of his probation 
order. The appellant and his parents had ample oppor-
tunity to prepare a defense, or retain counsel to prepare 
a defense had they felt that they had sufficient grounds 
for a defense or would not get a fair and impartial hear-
ing at the hands of the juvenile judge before "Thorn 
they had appeared many times. It is untenable to conceive 
that the appellant or his parents 'Yere unaware that the 
juvenile eourt 'vas about to reYoke his probation and 
send him to the State Industrial School. 
In tht'\ case of In re Olsen, 111 lTtah 365, 180 P. 2d 
~10, reliPd upon hy the appellant, the court in speaking of 
juve11ile court la"T said, 
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''However, these statutes all require that the par-
ents shall be given adequate notice of such a pro-
reeding. In this case appellant was given no notice 
that the court would inquire into his present ability 
to support or to contribute something to her sup-
port. Apparently, the order was based upon evi-
dence which was presented incident to neglect.'' 
The same cannot be said in this case. The notice to 
the appellant specifically named the alleged violations of 
his probation. He knew exactly of what the juvenile 
court would inquire. Less than two weeks prior to his 
final hearing, he had been told that his continued pro ba-
tion was contingent upon his living up to his probation. 
It cannot be said in this case as it was in the Olsen case 
that "apparently the order was based upon evidence 
\vhich was presented incident to neglect'' (or to the main 
inquiry). 
Notwithstanding the meticulous way in which the 
juvenile court dealt with the appellant in affording him 
notice and hearing before suspension of his promation it 
is doubtful whether such procedure would have been nec-
essary. The Utah Supreme Court has held that a juvenile 
delinquent who violates the terms of his probation may 
be committed to the Industrial School without n.otice to 
his parents, especially where the parents had notice of 
the original proceeding. Stocker v. Gowans, 45 Utah 556, 
1-± 7 Par. 911 ( 1915) ; See also In Re Jones, 252 P. 2d 284, 
41 ''rash. 2d 764; Ex parte Baeza, 185 P. 2d 242. (Empha-
sis added) 
Furthermore, a recent Utah Supreme Court case, 
Ex parte, S. H. 1 Utah 2d 186, 264 P. 2d 850 (1953) held 
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that a child placed on probation, after having been com-
mitted to the Industrial School is not entitled to a hear-
ing before being taken back into custody. 
Though it appears from the above case law that a 
juvenile delinquent who has violated the terms of proba-
tion may be committed to the State Industrial School 
without notice to his parents or a. rehearing, the juvenile 
court in this case afforded the appellant and his parents 
the opportunity to appear before the court; and after a 
formal hearing was held, the suspended sentence was re-
voked, and the child was committed to the State Indus-
trial School. The appellant cannot complain that notice 
to him of his violation of probation was insufficient, that 
he did not have ample opportunity and time to secure 
the services of counsel had he wished, or that the juvenile 
judge did not completely comply ",.ith the statutory re-
quirements of notice and hearing before committing him 
to the State Industrial School for further training. Ap-
pellant's brief contains no mention of information or 
defense that could and would have been presented to the 
court in behalf of the appellant had he obtained counsel 
at the last hearing. 
PoiNT II 
THE ORDER OF THE JU,"'"EXILE COURT IX 
THE DECREE D_A __ TED Jl ... XE 28, 1960, IS 
DEFINITE AND CERT.AJ~ ..t\_ND, THERE-
FORE, ENFORCEABLE. 
From reading the order, one can readily compre-
hend that, (1) the appellant is declared a delinquent, (~) 
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that the prior suspendPd commitment to the Industrial 
S('hool is revoked, and ( 3) that the appellant is no\v com-
mitted to the State Industrial School until he reaches the 
age of ~1 years or is sooner released. Appellant does not 
allege specifically what renders the juvenile court's order 
so indefinite as to be enforceable, but merely says that it 
is ambiguous, indefinite, uncertain and not susceptible of 
clear and concise meaning. He also furnishes no authori-
ties to substantiate his allegation of indefiniteness. 
It is generally held that for an order of the juvenile 
court to be valid and binding the court must have juris-
diction, and the period of detention must be specified or 
fixed. The order of the juvenile court in this case com-
plies \vith these requirements. See 43 C.J.S. Infants, 
Section 101, 102. Furthermore, the juvenile court strictly 
followed the statute pertaining to judgments in cases of 
delinquency. Section 55-10-30 U.C.A. 1953 states: 
''At the conclusion of any hearing the court 
may dismiss the case, or may render a decree and 
judgment that the child is delinquent, dependent, 
neglected or other,vise within the provisions of 
this chapter. If the juvenile is adjudged delin-
quent, dependent, neglected or other\vise within 
the provisions of this chapter, the court shall enter 
in \vriting the facts constituting such delinquency, 
dependency, neglect or other offense and may fur-
ther adjudge and decree as follows : 
* * * * 
(:~) That the child be committed to the state in-
dustrial school or to any suitable institution, chil-
dren's aid society or other agency incorporated 
under the laws of this state and authorized to care 
for children or to place them in family homes, or 
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to any such institution or agency provided by the 
state or a county; ... " 
It has further been held that surplusage contained in 
the order of commitment may be disregarded, 43 C.J.S., 
supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The juvenile court in bringing the appellant before it 
six times in a period of 18 months strictly complied with 
the statutes by which it receives jurisdiction. By its 
written order it instructed the appellant that unless he 
observed the order of the court and refrained from 
violating his probation order it would be revoked and 
he would be sent to the Industrial School. Appellant 
violated his probation and was promptly served with 
summons stating his exact violation. He had ample time 
to prepare his defense or retain counsel. Having not 
chosen to retain counsel he was nevertheless given a fair 
hearing, and an opportunity to refute his alleged viola-
tions. The court, having jurisdiction by reason of its 
compliance with the statutes, upon hearing the evidence, 
made a valid order which revoked appellant's prior sus-
pension, and the appellant is presently receiving further 
training in accordance with this valid commitment to 
the State Industrial School. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General - State of Utah 
By NEIL D. ScHAERRER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
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